But the Russian military continues to interact in determined efforts to regain restricted territory to the west. British intelligence estimates that because the begin of 2025 Russia has suffered 332,000 casualties, the best loss price because the invasion. Russia has made solely marginal good points, which Putin trumpets as victories as he throws extra males and tools into the Ukraine meatgrinder.
After all, Putin can not afford to confess failure, but it surely nonetheless appears as if he truly believes his technique is succeeding. Why?
The reply lies within the perverse incentives of Russian command and management (C2), which conceal the weaknesses of Russian FS. Russian C2 is concentrated in a single civilian with no army coaching (Putin), and his small circle of advisers.
Putin’s management discourages innovation by subject officers and welcomes blind obedience. Dangerous information from subject officers of all ranks is punished with demotion or arrest. Excellent news is rewarded with promotion. Because of this, subject officers routinely lie about their failures in hopes of promotion and reassignment. There’s nearly no energetic seek for data by headquarters to right misinformation despatched by subject officers.
Russian drive constructions are notoriously corrupt—a corruption that’s anticipated and tolerated, but in addition might be an excuse for punishment. Officers steal from their models by exaggerating the scale of the unit and pocketing the unused pay. Therefore, many Russian models are severely understaffed. Troopers steal from their models by promoting weapons, ammunition, and gasoline, leaving their models under-equipped. The overwhelming majority of battle-hardened troopers are lengthy gone, as are army trainers, who had been all despatched to the entrance strains. New Russian recruits are untrained and unaware of the dangers they face.
Russia’s C2 and FS Issues from the Begin of the Invasion
A short overview makes it clear that C2 and FS issues have bedeviled the Russian invasion from the beginning of the 2022 invasion. Planning for the invasion ignored commonplace army doctrine, which emphasizes that profitable invasions require enough scale, pace, and drive. The appreciable literature on the drive differentials wanted for an invasion, together with Soviet doctrine, agrees on the basic rule {that a} frontal assault requires a 3:1 drive ratio to compensate for the upper casualties suffered by the invaders.
Efficient command and management are additionally important for the success of an invasion. This contains correct intelligence about enemy forces, freedom for subject officers to improvise as wanted, fast subject intelligence upward to tell ways and technique because the invasion proceeds, and fast top-down selections in response to subject intelligence.
The 2022 invasion violated all these necessities. With the intention to conceal its intentions and obtain an operational shock, the planning of the invasion was restricted to a really small group led by Putin. Not even Russia’s Overseas Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was included on this group. The Russian subject commanders on the bottom in Belarus for army workout routines had no concept that they might be main an invasion. The success of this secrecy got here at a excessive price: there was no alternative for critiquing the invasion plan and no consideration of fall-back methods.
Russian intelligence concerning the Ukraine’s response was primarily based fully on defective assumptions {that a} high-speed invasion would demoralize the Ukrainian army, the Russian army would simply defeat the Ukrainian army on the battlefield, the highest Ukrainian leaders could be shortly captured and executed, and that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians would both welcome the Russian invaders or stay passive.
The three:1 drive differential rule ought to have required an invasion of 590,000 Russian, provided that the Russians knew the Ukrainian army had 196,600 active-duty personnel. As a substitute, the Russians deliberate an invasion of 190,000 personnel, truly smaller than the mixed Ukrainian armed forces. Even worse, as an alternative of massing its invasion drive at one level to attain a breakthrough, the Russians determined to assault on six totally different axes: from the Black Sea within the southeast, from Crimea within the south, from Donbas within the east, from Belgorod within the northeast (in direction of Kharkiv), from Kursk within the northeast (in direction of Kyiv), and from Gomel, Belarus, within the north (in direction of Kyiv).
All of the Russian invasion routes confronted surprising issues, however the flaws in Russian C2 and FS might be illustrated by the destiny of Russia’s most promising assault, coming from Gomel, Belarus, and geared toward Kyiv. This included an airborne assault on Antonov airport, within the Kyiv suburb of Hostumel. The Ukrainians had not anticipated an assault from Belarus and had been unprepared for each the land invasion and the airborne assault.
Why did these assaults fail? Russian secrecy concerning the invasion had left the Russian floor forces in Belarus fully unprepared. They had been knowledgeable of their roles within the invasion solely 24 hours earlier than the invasion. Because of this, they lacked ammunition, gasoline, meals, and communications. They didn’t anticipate heavy combating. Mud pressured their armor to make use of the few roads, inflicting visitors jams. They encountered total cities that weren’t on their maps, requiring them to cease and ask civilians the place they had been. Residents reported the Russian positions to Ukrainian authorities.
The Ukrainians acted swiftly to confront the Russian assault from Gomel, which was approaching the outskirts of Kyiv. They dedicated most of their obtainable particular forces and particular models of different safety models, referred to as up all their reserve models, and mobilized the cadets and employees of their army academies into new battalions, supported by two brigades of artillery and one mechanized brigade. Even so, the Russians had a 12:1 troop benefit on the Gomel axis. On 27 February, their advance models had been capable of seize the suburb of Bucha, simply west of Kyiv.
Nevertheless, the telephone calls from residents from cities within the Russian path permitted Ukrainian artillery to focus on the Russian columns. The Ukrainian forces knew the territory effectively, giving them an enormous tactical benefit, and so they had been capable of assault the slow-moving Russian columns nearly at will, inflicting panic, abandonment of kit, and blockage of the roads. Because the Russian columns stopped shifting, their losses multiplied. The Russian advance models that had reached Bucha had been quick on gasoline, ammunition, and manpower. They assumed defensive positions, ready for reinforcements that by no means arrived.
Within the battle for Antonov airport on the sting of Kyiv, the Russians used helicopters and elite airborne troops. These troops had been to seize and execute the Ukrainian management. However the Ukrainians surrounded the airport with heavy armor, pounding the Russians. They had been capable of seize the airport, driving the Russians into the encircling woods. Whereas the Russians had been capable of recapture the airport after a few days, the Ukrainians had time to destroy the runways, making unimaginable the touchdown of reinforcements and stopping the Russians from capturing the Ukrainian management.
On March sixteenth the Ukrainian authorities introduced a counteroffensive within the Kyiv area, and by the top of March, Russian floor forces had been retreating north from the Bucha space. By April 2nd your entire Kyiv oblast was again in Ukrainian palms, together with the realm bordering Belarus.
What was the Russian response to this humiliating defeat? These Russian generals who weren’t killed, had been largely cashiered or arrested, as had been most of the colonels. The catastrophe resulted largely from Putin’s management, however the defeated models took the blame. This added to the motivation for officers to lie about failure and faux achievement.
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The First Stalemate
The battle has continued by numerous phases. The second part, from early April by the top of August, 2022, was marked by energetic combating alongside entrance strains, with heavy Russian losses, however was a relative stalemate when it comes to territorial good points by both facet.
The Second Ukrainian Offensive
The third part started on September 6, 2022, when Ukrainian troops attacked the Kharkiv entrance close to the Russian border. On September 9, Ukrainian mechanized models broke by. Ukrainian forces raced north and east. The cities of Kupiansk and Izium fell to the Ukrainians on 10 September. By the subsequent day the Russian forces north of Kharkiv had retreated over the border, leaving all the Kharkiv Oblast underneath Ukrainian management. Urgent on to the east, Ukrainian forces on 12 September crossed the Siverskyi Donets, and on 1 October the Ukrainians recaptured Lyman, a serious railway hub, and took as prisoners an estimated 5,000 Russian troops.
As Russian forces rushed to the northeast entrance, Ukraine launched its counteroffensive within the Kherson area on October 2. By 9 October Ukrainian forces had retaken 1,170 sq. kilometers of territory, urgent on towards the Dnieper River and the town of Kherson. On 11 November, Kherson was occupied by the Ukrainians.
The Second Stalemate
The second interval of stalemate dates from 12 November 2022 till the current. Throughout this three-year interval, the battle has seen the introduction of drone warfare on an enormous scale, first by Ukraine after which by Russia. On account of the drone warfare, your entire battle has modified in character. Drones have made assaults by armored autos so pricey that the battle has reverted to trench warfare harking back to World Conflict I. Drones now account for two-thirds or extra of front-line casualties within the battle.
Ukraine’s authorities discarded Soviet-era laws to supply tax breaks and revenue incentives to impartial Ukrainian drone producers, authorizing the Ukrainian army to contract with them. These impartial firms have made good use of Ukraine’s massive cadre of expert aeronautical engineers and data expertise specialists. About 200 of those firms are formally acknowledged to obtain army contracts, and as many as 300 different teams manufacture drones and donate them on to army models. Nevertheless, monetary assets stay a limiting issue.
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Russia has quickly developed its personal drone capability. Furthermore, Russia has the assets to outproduce Ukraine, even when its drones are much less subtle. Russian drone manufacturing is restricted much less by funds than by the seek for microchips, smuggled from the west or purchased from China. Russia additionally has ballistic and airborne missile techniques which can be arduous for Ukraine to convey down. Russia has been utilizing large barrages of drones and missiles to demoralize Ukraine. However this effort is counterproductive. Bombings anger enemy populations and stiffen resistance, as proven in WWII by the Blitz of London and Allied carpet bombings of Germany. Russian barrages might have strained Ukraine’s economic system, however they haven’t lessened resistance.
Whereas the drone/missile battle is well-known, Ukraine’s different protection business development is much less recognized. Ukraine now produces extra artillery shells than all of NATO’s 32 members and Europe. Since 2022, home manufacturing of armored personnel carriers has elevated by 400 p.c, artillery by 200 p.c, ammunition by 150 p.c, and anti-tank weapons by one hundred pc. By 2025, a single Ukrainian manufacturing facility was producing 20 Bohdana howitzers every month, related in specs to the French Caesar. Ukrainian protection firms ship howitzers in 60 days for $2.5 million in comparison with a several-year wait and a value of $4.3 million within the West.
Russia has needed to develop a brand new tactical strategy for the energetic fronts. Teams of two or three troopers are pressured (by firing squads) to run in direction of Ukrainian strains and in the event that they stay, conceal themselves to struggle later. Specialised models resembling snipers, artillery spotters, or drone operators attempt to determine and goal the sources of firing at these people. Then bigger assault models transfer ahead to seize territory. Nevertheless, these assault models at the moment are poorly educated, and their tools is out of date armor or extra typically merely vehicles, vans, and bikes, typically closely camouflaged. Ukrainian spotter drones are ready for these assaults, and as soon as the Russian autos are in movement and supported by Russian artillery, Ukrainian drones blow up each the autos and the artillery. On a typical day in autumn 2025, the Russians had been dropping 1,000 troopers, 10 armored models, 25 artillery barrels, and 100 autos. By providing more and more excessive incentives, Russia was recruiting 30,000 troopers a month, barely sufficient to cowl losses.
Russian digital warfare has improved dramatically, with a deal with disrupting Ukrainian drones. Because of this, Ukrainian forces at the moment are dropping about 10,000 drones monthly. Russian air defenses even have improved, lowering the power of Ukrainian fighter jets to assault. Russian engineers have been efficient in designing and constructing defensive trenchworks, minefields, and tank traps in areas they management.
Nevertheless, Ukraine air defenses have additionally improved. Russian airplanes now should launch airborne missiles from Russian territory, with a substantial lack of accuracy. Russian floor to floor ballistic missiles are arduous to convey down, but in addition lack accuracy.
Confronted with the hardening of Russian entrance strains, Ukrainian forces are centered on inflicting excessive Russian casualties, fairly than attacking themselves. The exception happens when the Ukrainians resolve to roll again a Russian salient to forestall it from being hardened. The large Russian missile and drone assaults deep in Ukraine have required the Ukrainians to speculate closely in missile and drone defenses of all kinds, which have one thing like a 90% success price. Nonetheless, Ukraine suffers appreciable harm. This serves as a continuing reminder to Ukrainians of what’s at stake.
Conclusion
Putin’s battle in Ukraine has supplied him with a rationale for stifling dissent in Russia, redirecting huge assets to show Russia’s economic system to army manufacturing, sponsoring efforts to overturn governments that help Ukraine, and making ready for extra invasions that can re-establish the Russian empire and cement his legacy as a contemporary Stalin.
Regardless of all this, Putin remains to be dropping the battle in Ukraine. That battle is chewing up males and tools at an unsustainable price. Furthermore, it has been a strategic catastrophe. The battle strengthened Ukrainian nationalism. It energized the European members of NATO and triggered Finland and Sweden to affix NATO, which doubled the size of NATO’s frontier with Russia. It destroyed the parable of Russian army superiority. It ended Russian pure gasoline exports to the European Union, which had been fastidiously cultivated for many years. It led to the emigration of greater than half one million of Russia’s greatest and brightest.
Most NATO international locations at the moment are rearming and increasing their militaries. The E.U. international locations mixed gross home revenue EU GDP of $19.4 trillion in 2024 added to the UK GDP of $3.6 trillion totaled over 23 trillion {dollars}, whereas the gross home revenue of the Russian Federation RF GDP in 2024 was 2.1 trillion. Over the long term, Russia can not compete with Western Europe. Europe can afford to help Ukraine’s economic system and battle effort whereas European international locations ramp up their protection industries and army infrastructure. Putin will finally lose not solely his Ukraine Conflict, but in addition his dream of a brand new Russian empire.
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